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Abstract  
The same stimulus may elicit different affective responses across individuals and contexts. 
According to the psychological constructionist perspective of emotion, individual differences in 
emotion experiences arise in part from differences in emotion conceptual knowledge and 
emotion granularity. The present study examined how individual differences in emotion 
conceptual knowledge complexity and emotion granularity influence perceivers’ ability to 
distinguish between fear and disgust. We hypothesized that greater conceptual knowledge 
complexity and greater emotion granularity would be associated with more emotion-specific 
appraisals of fear and disgust stimuli on an appraisal task. To investigate our hypothesis, 96 
undergraduate students at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill were recruited for the 
study. Overall, our hypothesis was not supported insofar that individual differences in conceptual 
knowledge complexity and emotion granularity did not predict the degree of emotion-specific 
appraisals of fear and disgust stimuli. 
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Bear Grylls is a revered wilderness survival expert, an established popular culture icon, 
and an all-around daredevil. He has clashed with alligators, swung across treacherous ravines, 
and tight-roped across raging whitewater rapids. When faced with precarious wilderness 
environments that would tenably overwhelm many of us with fear, Grylls has tackled such 
situations with heartfelt exuberance. Consider his trek across the Catskill Mountains with the 
actor Zac Efron. Despite sharing a high arousal state, individual differences in emotion 
experiences prompted Grylls to perceive the perilous trek as an adventure whereas a visibly 
shaken Efron most certainly qualified the situation as a predicament.  
Individual differences in emotion experiences impart significant implications not only for 
how we subjectively feel in any given moment but also for other fundamental aspects of mental 
life, such as our attitudes and personality (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Eagly & Chaiken, 1998; 
Ito & Cacioppo, 2001; Revelle, 1995; Watson, 2000; Yik et al., 2002), stereotyping and prejudice 
(e.g., Cacioppo & Berntson, 2001; Forgas & Fiedler, 1996; Moreno & Bodenhausen, 2001), 
judgement and decision-making (e.g., Forgas, 1995; Haidt, 2002; Slovic et al., 2002), and overall 
well-being (Davidson, 2004; Gallo et al., 2005). The present study examines how individual 
differences in emotion conceptual knowledge complexity and emotion granularity influence 
emotion experiences. We specifically examine how conceptual knowledge complexity and 
emotion granularity influence the degree of specificity by which perceivers differentiate between 
fear and disgust.   
The Psychological Construction of Emotions  
Emotions are omnipresent in our lives and in the lives of others. Although they are a vital 
component of our day-to-day functioning as they influence cognition, development, and 
personality (Lewis, Haviland-Jones, & Barrett, 2008), great variability exists in how emotions 
manifest across individuals and contexts. For instance, I an American, may scowl in anger while 
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attending a Nickelback concert whereas a Canadian peer may find themselves singing along in 
overt happiness. Despite the ostensible variability in individual emotion experiences, basic 
emotion perspectives (e.g., Ekman, 2003; Izard, Youngstrom, Fine, Mostow, & Trentacosta, 
2006; Plutchik, 2003) contend that perceivers possess a universal and uniform discrete set of 
naturally-occurring emotions by virtue of their mammalian heritage (Darwin, 1872/1965).  By 
proposing that emotions correspond to unique neural (e.g., Canon, 1921; Panksepp, 2005,  
2006; Panksepp & Gordon, 2003; Panksepp, Knutson, & Burgdorf, 2002), facial (Cannon, 1927;  
Ekman, 1992, 1993, Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Fridlund, Ekman, & Oster, 1987), and behavioral 
(Darwin, 1872/1965; Ekman, 1992; Izard, 1992; Watson, 1919) correlates, basic emotion 
perspectives effectively reify emotions as entities that we naturally have rather than something 
that we constantly do. In contrast, psychological constructionist models of emotion more 
adequately capture the variability of individual emotion experiences. These models suggest that 
emotions are continuously constructed rather than inherently given. In particular, the conceptual-
act model posits that a perceiver’s affective experiences depend largely on the specific context in 
which the experiences take place.  
In principle, the conceptual-act model is grounded in the assumption that emotion 
experiences are psychological events comprised from more basic psychological processes. These 
basic processes include core affect and conceptual knowledge (Lindquist, 2013). The metaphor 
of a recipe has often been employed to describe the conceptual-act model such that core affect 
and conceptual knowledge are not separate, static psychological “ingredients” but are instead 
capable of flexibly combining into multiple “recipes” that form our various affective states 
(Barrett, 2009).  Core affect is the psychological representation of internal bodily phenomenon. It 
is typically experienced as of sense of pleasantness or unpleasantness accompanied by some 
degree of arousal (Barrett, 2006b; Lindquist, 2013; Russell, 2003, 2005, 2009; Russell & Barrett, 
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1999). Additionally, conceptual knowledge denotes an individual’s understanding of a particular 
emotion experience (Barrett, 2006b, 2009; Lindquist, 2013; Lindquist & Barrett, 2008a) gained 
through relevant past experiences. Importantly, core affect and conceptual knowledge combine to 
form a perceiver’s emotion experiences in any given situation. Together, these two basic 
psychological processes form the basis of all emotional life (Barrett, 2009).   
Core affect. Core affect is the continuously present and ever-changing mental 
representation of internal bodily phenomenon in relation to external (e.g. a cool breeze) or 
internal events (e.g., remembering an unhappy occasion, changes in hormone levels; Barrett, 
2004; 2006c; Russell, 2003, 2005, 2009; Russell & Barrett, 1999; Lindquist & Barrett, 2008a). 
Akin to temperature regulation and acid-base balance, core affect is also imperative to 
maintaining homeostasis (Lindquist, 2013). Although we are not always cognizant of our core 
affect, it remains an ever-present element of our daily lives like a soft hum of a clock whose ticks 
only become noticeable every now and then when we attend to them. Aside from startling noises, 
sudden movements, and other stimuli that act directly on the nervous system, objects and events 
seldom possess inherent core affective value (Owren & Bachorwoski, 2003; Owren & Rendell, 
2001; Barrett, 2006b; Lindquist, 2013). Therefore, core affective associations typically occur 
over time through associative learning (Barrett & Bliss-Moreau, 2009; Bliss-Moreau, Barrett & 
Wright, 2008; Lindquist, 2013).  For instance, a perceiver may associate a sense of 
unpleasantness with dark alleys due to negative past experiences or prevailing cultural 
assumptions that danger lurks in dark alleyways. 
Conceptual knowledge. Emotion experiences arise when core affect combines with 
conceptual knowledge. Emotion conceptual knowledge is embodied by relevant past experiences 
Barrett, 2013; 2015) by which perceivers learn what it means to experience a specific emotion in 
regards to its commonly associated characteristics (Barrett, 2006b, 2009; Lindquist, 2013; 
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Lindquist & Barrett, 2008a). These characteristics include subjective experiences, physiological 
reactions, behaviors, and commonly associated situational contexts (Barrett, Wilson-Mendenhall, 
& Barsalou, 2014, 2015). Consider fear. A perceiver’s conceptual knowledge of fear may consist 
of increased contemplation (a subjective characteristic), increased perspiration (a physiological 
sensation), withdrawal from social life (a behavioral characteristic), and being alone in the dark 
(a contextual feature). Importantly, a perceiver can possess more than one conceptual knowledge 
of an emotion category such that the same emotion may look, feel, and confer different 
behavioral implications across perceivers and situations (Barrett, 2006b). Thus, emotions are not 
static one-size-fits-all mental representations but instead are flexible responses operating within 
situational demands (Barsalou, 1999, 2003, 2005; Simmons et al., 2003; Barrett, 2009).   
Situated conceptualization. Core affective experiences gain meaning when perceivers 
combine their conceptual knowledge with situation-specific appraisals. To this end some 
researchers have denoted instances of emotion as situated conceptualizations. Conceptualization 
is a quick, automatic, and implicit process in which core affect and conceptual knowledge fuse to 
form the various emotion states that the Western world labels as sadness, happiness, anger, and 
so on (Barrett, 2006a, 2009, 2012; Barrett, Wilson-Mendenhall, & Barsalou, 2014; Lindquist & 
Barrett, 2008a, 2008b; Lindquist, Wager, Kober et al., 2012; Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011; 
Lindquist, 2013). The interplay between core affect, conceptual knowledge, and 
conceptualization is illustrated by the following study (Lindquist & Barrett, 2008a). When people 
experiencing negative core affect were primed with the conceptual knowledge of fear, they were 
more likely to interpret the world as full of risk than when primed with the conceptual knowledge 
of anger, suggesting that conceptual knowledge helps transform core affective sensations into 
meaningful affective experiences that subsequently guide future action (Lindquist & Barrett, 
2008a).    
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Another study also illustrates the integral role that conceptual knowledge plays in shaping 
individual emotional experiences. Researchers have found that temporarily blocking emotion 
conceptual knowledge through semantic satiation (i.e., the loss of a word’s meaning due to 
verbal repetition; Esposito & Pelton, 1971) obstructs conceptualization. In Lindquist et al. 
(2006), words representing discrete emotions (e.g. “anger”, “fear”, etc.) were either temporarily 
primed or satiated. In the prime condition, participants verbally repeated an emotion label (e.g. 
“anger”) 3 times whereas participants in the satiation condition repeated an emotion label (e.g., 
“anger”) 30 times. Participants were then asked to evaluate whether the word matched a given 
facial expression (e.g., an expression depicting anger). Participants in the satiation task were 
slower in their evaluations, suggesting that conceptual knowledge facilitates the navigation of 
our emotional lives. In particular, it is the very plasticity of this system that accounts for the vast 
variety of human emotions that can in one instance lift us to the heights of euphoria and in 
another to the depths of despair (Barrett, 2009).    
Importantly, not every perceiver shares the same repertoire of conceptual knowledge. 
Consequently, the same core affective sensation can mean very different things to different 
individuals such that emotion experiences often vary across individuals. The variability by which 
people experience emotions is illustrated by cross-cultural studies of emotion. For example, 
whereas sadness is likened to loss in America, it is likened to physical pain in Russia 
(Wierzbicka, 2009). Additionally, behavioral responses to the same affective state may vary by 
culture. Consider anger. In the United States, anger involves distancing oneself from others but 
to increasing proximity to others in Japan (Kitayama et al., 2006). Emotion experiences can 
differ among individuals within the same culture as well. Whereas some individuals are very rich 
and descriptive in their emotion experiences, others are anchored on the opposite end of the 
emotion continuum. Consider Brod, a fictitious character from Johnathan Safran Foer’s 
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Everything is Illuminated (2002). Brod proclaims that she possesses 613 distinct types of 
sadness, each perfectly unique. Similar to Brod, many people often communicate subtle 
distinctions between their affective states (e.g., despair vs. sadness vs. melancholy vs. nostalgia) 
to others and to themselves (Kimhy et al., 2014).  
As consequence of their ability to clearly communicate nuanced emotional states, these 
individuals experience better social functioning (Barrett et al., 2001). In stark contrast, consider 
alexithymia, a non-clinical condition in which individuals grapple with the inability to 
distinguish between and verbally express different emotion states (Barrett, 2006b; Mayer & 
Salovey, 1993; Taylor & Bagby, 2000). Importantly, clinical conditions such as schizophrenia 
(Kring, Barrett & Gard, 2003), borderline personality disorder (Suvak et al., 2011), and major 
depressive disorder (Erbas et al., 2014) have been associated with the reduced ability to 
distinguish between different affective states.  What accounts for such variability in individual 
emotion experiences? According to the conceptual-act model, individual differences in emotion 
conceptual knowledge complexity and emotion granularity may account for individual 
differences in emotion experiences.  
Conceptual knowledge complexity. The complexity of a perceiver’s emotion conceptual 
knowledge influences their ability to distinguish affective experiences of their own and of others 
(Widen & Russell, 2008). For instance, pre-linguistic children are able to identify facial 
expressions in terms of valence (i.e., positive vs. negative) but not in terms of specific discrete 
emotions (Widen & Russell, 2008).  When 2-year olds are asked to match a set of pictures 
representing the emotion categories of anger, sadness, disgust, fear, and happiness with an 
additional image, they tend to cluster unpleasant faces into one category and exclude the singular 
pleasant face, happiness. It appears that children cannot make more fine-grain distinctions 
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between specific emotion categories until they acquire the capacity to understand more complex 
emotion concepts (Widen & Russell, 2008).   
Emotion granularity. A related concept, emotion granularity (i.e., the ability to make 
distinctions between different emotion experiences; Barrett, 2004; Boden et al., 2013) is thought 
to partially result from the complexity of one’s emotion conceptual knowledge. Emotion 
granularity is also probably related to a perceiver’s ability and motivation to conceptualize 
affective experiences either as broad affective experiences or as instances of a specific emotion 
(Carstensen et al., 2000; Lane et al., 1990; Lane & Schwartz, 1987; Larsen & Cutler, 1996).   
For instance, some people make broad categorizations whereas others make more fine-grained 
distinctions (Barrett, 1998; Barrett, Gross, Conner & Benvenuto, 2001; Feldman, 1995).  
Perceivers high in emotion granularity generally utilize global terms (e.g. “bad”, “good”) 
rather than discrete emotion labels (e.g. “angry”, “happy”) to describe their affective experiences 
(Barrett, 2006b). Consider the following example. During a confrontation, someone who is low 
in granularity may simply state that they feel “sad”. Alternatively, someone who is high in 
granularity may exclaim that they feel “exasperated”, “infuriated”, or “furious”.  Because 
perceivers higher in emotional granularity are able to express their affective experiences in more 
precise terms, they have better social functioning than their counterparts, demonstrating just how 
crucial emotion conceptual knowledge is to our ability to navigate our emotion experiences 
(Kimhy et al., 2014).   
The Present Study  
Because conceptual knowledge is such an essential ingredient of everyday emotional life 
(Barrett, 2009), further elucidation of individual differences in concept knowledge and its 
associated concepts (e.g., emotion granularity) may yield valuable insight to the 
conceptualization process itself. However, little work has been done to directly examine the role 
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of concept knowledge complexity and emotion granularity in the differentiation of same-
valenced emotions in emotion experiences.  Therefore, the present study seeks to demonstrate 
this relationship by examining the degree of emotion-specific appraisals on an appraisal task in 
which participants are asked to discriminate between disgust and fear stimuli. Disgust and fear 
were selected as the emotions of choice because they are both high-intensity, visceral negative 
emotions with a high degree of similarity. This similarity is important to the goals of the present 
study because previous literature suggests that distinguishing between two emotions of similar 
valence requires a degree of emotion granularity (Smidt & Suvak, 2015). Building on previous 
literature, we predicted that participants with greater conceptual knowledge complexity and 
greater emotion granularity would show greater emotion-specific appraisals of disgust and fear 
stimuli on the appraisal task. We also predicted that participants with lower conceptual 
knowledge complexity and lower emotion granularity would show less specificity in 
differentiating between disgust and fear. 
 To investigate our hypotheses, we examined the complexity of participants’ emotion 
conceptual knowledge by having them complete a card sort task involving emotion-related words 
(e.g., begrudging, repulsion, anger, etc.) in which the number of piles made indicated the depth 
of conceptual knowledge complexity. We also examined participants’ emotion granularity by 
having them complete a picture rating task in which they rated the degree to which each image 
elicited specific emotions (e.g., anxiety, anger, fear, sadness, etc.) such that the amount of 
differentiation between emotion categories indicated the level of emotion granularity. Finally, an 
appraisal task was implemented to gauge participants’ ability to make emotion-specific 
appraisals of fear and disgust stimuli.  
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Method  
Participants   
We recruited 96 undergraduate students enrolled in a Psychology 101 course at the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill to participate in the current study in exchange for 
one Psychology 101 credit hour. Of these 96 participants, 77.9% identified as White, 10.5% as 
Asian/Pacific Islander, 7.4% as Black/African American, 3.2% as Latino/Hispanic, and 1.1% as 
Native American. Our participants were 56.3% female, 43.8% male, and ranged in age from 18 
years to 24 years (Mean [M] = 18.79, Standard Deviation [SD] = .97).   
Measures  
Emotion appraisal task. A computerized task was implemented to measure participants’ 
responses toward disgust, fear, and neutral stimuli. During the task, participants were presented 
with disgust, fear, and neutral images1 pulled from the International Affective Picture System 
(IAPS; Lang et al., 1999) in two counterbalanced blocks. Our stimuli included 20 fear-related 
images (e.g., threatening-looking animals, natural disasters), 20 disgust-related images (e.g., 
trash, insects, rodents, flesh wounds), and 20 neutral images (e.g., lamps, towels). In one block, 
participants were asked to evaluate the images as either contamination or not contamination 
whereas in the other block, participants were asked to evaluate the images as either threat or not 
threat. Participants were instructed to press one key (i.e., P) if an emotional appraisal (e.g., 
contamination or threat) applied to the presented image and to press another key (i.e., Q) if an 
emotional appraisal was deemed inappropriate (e.g., not contamination or not threat).   
The Affect Misattribution Procedure. As a part of a larger study, participants also 
completed the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; see Payne et al., 2005). The AMP was 
                                                 
1 Images were presented at four time intervals that varied in duration from 3ms, 17ms, 30ms, to 43ms as a part of a 
larger study.   
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used to examine participants’ implicit responses to the same set of stimuli (e.g., fear, disgust, and 
neutral primes) utilized in the appraisal task. However, because implicit processes are not a 
crucial component of the present study, the AMP will not be further discussed.  
Emotion granularity. Emotion granularity was assessed with 20 unpleasant visual 
stimuli gathered from the IAPS. Participants rated the extent to which each image evoked anger, 
anxiety, boredom, disgust, downheartedness, fear, guilt, and sadness on a scale of 1 (not at all) to  
5 (extremely). Higher levels of granularity were indicated by greater differentiation between 
emotion categories (e.g., rating an image as evoking one or a few emotions). In contrast, lower 
levels of granularity were indicated by less differentiation between emotion categories (e.g., 
rating an image as evoking many emotions).   
Emotion concept knowledge. Emotion concept knowledge was assessed with a card sort 
task. Participants were asked to organize affectively-descriptive adjectives (e.g. begrudging, 
repulsion, anger, worry, unhappiness, sadness, shame, etc.) into separate categories. We adapted 
this measure from studies that used a similar task as a measure of self-complexity (Rafaeli-Mor, 
Gotlib, & Revelle, 1999; Showers, Abramson, & Hogan, 1998). In our study, the production of 
more categories was indicative of greater emotion conceptual knowledge complexity whereas the 
production of fewer categories was indicative of lower conceptual knowledge complexity. 
Questionnaires.2  
Fear survey schedule II.  The Fear Survey Schedule (FSS-II; Geer, 1965) was employed 
to measure participants’ sensitivity to fear. During the FSS-II, participants rated their degree of 
fear towards 51 items on a scale from 1 (no fear) to 7 (terror). Items in the scale included 
different situations (e.g. being a passenger in a car, being misunderstood, failing a test, 
                                                 
2 The FSS-II, DS-R, and general demographic questionnaires were administered as part of a larger study. 
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suffocating, the death of a loved one) and objects that may invoke fear (e.g. sharp objects, dead 
bodies, spiders, snakes, cemeteries).   
Disgust scale revised. The Disgust Scale Revised (DS-R; Olatunji et al., 2007) was 
employed to measure sensitivity to disgust. During the DS-R, participants rated their degree of 
disgust towards 25 hypothetical situations. For the first 13 situations, participants evaluated 
whether each statement applied to them by selecting “true” or “false.” Items include statements 
like "It would bother me to see a rat run across my path in the park”. For the remaining 12 
situations, participants evaluated how disgusting they found each scenario (not disgusting, 
slightly disgusting, very disgusting). Items included statements like "you are about to drink a 
glass of milk when you smell that it is spoiled.” 
General demographics. Participants were asked to indicate their gender (male or female), 
ethnicity (Caucasian/White, African American/Black, Asian/Pacific Islander, Hispanic/Latino, 
Native American, Other), age, and ability to read Chinese (yes or no).  
Procedure  
After obtaining informed consent, participants were instructed to complete the appraisal 
task, AMP, card sort task, and emotion granularity task. We randomized the order of these tasks. 
Afterward, participants completed the survey measures of disgust and fear sensitivity in addition 
to a demographic questionnaire.   
Data Analysis Plan  
We first computed a variable reflecting emotion-specific appraisals of disgust and fear 
stimuli by taking the average of the proportion of emotion-specific appraisals (e.g., 
contamination appraisals of disgust stimuli; threat appraisals of fear stimuli) on the appraisal 
task. We then subtracted the average proportion of cross-emotion affective appraisals (e.g., 
contamination appraisal of fear stimuli; threat appraisals of disgust stimuli) to control for a 
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general tendency to make negative appraisals to negatively-valenced stimuli. Thus, on this 
variable, higher values reflect the proportion of emotion-specific appraisals made by participants, 
controlling for the proportion of cross-emotion affective appraisals.  
We also computed an emotion differentiation score for our emotion granularity measure. 
We did so by first computing an intraclass correlation between the ratings of the different 
emotions across the different stimuli in the emotion granularity task for each participant. Thus, 
higher intraclass correlation coefficients reflect less differentiation between different emotions. 
This is a typical measure of emotion granularity drawn from previous studies (e.g., Tugade, 
Fredrickson, & Barrett, 2004). We then subtracted the intraclass correlation coefficient by one 
such that higher numbers reflected greater differentiation while lower numbers reflected less 
differentiation.  
Results  
To test our hypothesis that emotion conceptual knowledge complexity and emotion 
granularity predict the degree of specificity in distinguishing between disgust and fear stimuli, 
we calculated correlations between the proportion of emotion-specific appraisals on the appraisal 
task, the number of piles made in the card sort task, and the emotion differentiation score on the 
measure of emotion granularity. We found that a nonsignificant weak positive relationship exists 
between emotion-specific appraisal and emotion conceptual knowledge granularity, r (94) = .06, 
p = .58) and between emotion-specific appraisals and emotion conceptual knowledge 
complexity, r (94) =.12, p = .24). Additionally, we also found a nonsignificant weak positive 
relationship between emotion conceptual knowledge complexity and conceptual knowledge 
granularity, r (94) = .14, p = .20).   
  As part of an exploratory analysis to investigate our non-significant findings, we 
examined whether participants in our sample made emotion specific appraisals in the first place. 
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To do so, we conducted a 2 (Appraisal: Contamination vs. Threat) x 3 (Prime Type: Disgust vs. 
Fear vs. Neutral) Repeated Measures analysis of variance (ANOVA; see Table 1). The main 
effect of appraisal F (1, 95) = .184, p = .67, η2 = .00 was not significant. However, there was a 
significant main effect of prime type F (2, 190) = 108.75, p = .00, η2 = .53, such that participants 
tended to make more negative appraisals of fear stimuli. This main effect was qualified by a 
significant 2-way interaction between appraisal and prime type, F (2, 190) = 16.98, p = .00, η2 = 
.15, suggesting that the type of appraisals made depended on the type of prime seen.  
To further probe this effect, we conducted a 2 (Appraisal: Contamination vs. Disgust) x 2 
(Prime Type: Disgust vs. Fear) Repeated Measures ANOVA to determine whether participants 
demonstrated the ability to distinguish between disgust and fear stimuli. The main effect of 
appraisal, F (1, 95) = 2.39, p = .13, η2 = .02 was not significant, but the main effect of prime 
type, F (1, 95) = 19.55, p = .00, η2 = .17 (see Table 1) was significant such that participants 
tended to make more negative appraisals of fear stimuli compared to disgust or neutral stimuli. 
Overall, we did not find a significant 2-way interaction between appraisal and prime type, F (1, 
95) = 1.38, p = .24, η2 = .01, indicating that participants tended not to differentiate in their 
appraisals of disgust and fear stimuli. Additional post-hoc analyses indicated that although 
participants did not distinguish between disgust and fear stimuli specifically, they did tend to 
distinguish between negative and neutral stimuli more generally.  In particular, participants made 
more contamination appraisals to negative compared to neutral stimuli, F (1, 95) = 53.31, p = 
.00, η2 = .36, and a more threat appraisals to negative compared to neutral stimuli, F (1, 95) = 
163.21, p = .00, η2 = .63.  
Discussion  
  
The present study endeavored to demonstrate how a perceiver’s degree of emotion 
conceptual knowledge complexity and emotion granularity influences their emotion experiences. 
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In particular, we anticipated that greater conceptual knowledge complexity and greater emotion 
granularity would predict more specificity in appraisals of disgust and fear stimuli. We also 
anticipated that lower conceptual knowledge complexity and lower emotion granularity would 
predict less specificity in appraisals of disgust and fear stimuli. Contrary to our predictions, the 
results of the current study are insufficient to support our hypothesis that individual differences 
in emotion conceptual knowledge complexity and emotion granularity predict the degree of 
specificity by which perceivers differentiate between the high-intensity visceral negative 
emotions of disgust and fear. Despite our nonsignificant findings, emotion conceptual knowledge 
complexity and emotion granularity remain important areas for future research as emotions 
influence our attitudes and personality (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Eagly & Chaiken, 1998; Ito 
& Cacioppo, 2001; Revelle, 1995; Watson, 2000; Yik et al., 2002), stereotyping and prejudice 
(e.g., Cacioppo & Berntson, 2001; Forgas & Fiedler, 1996; Moreno & Bodenhausen, 2001), 
judgement and decision-making (e.g., Forgas, 1995; Haidt, 2002; Slovic et al., 2002), and overall 
well-being (Davidson, 2004; Gallo et al., 2005).   
Limitations and Future Directions   
  
  The findings of the present study must be interpreted within light of its limitations. Two 
notable limitations are evident. First, the images utilized in the appraisal task systematically 
varied in terms of visual complexity. Specifically, fear images were far more visually simple as 
they represented centrally-focused stimuli such as a snake whereas disgust images were 
relatively more complex as they featured multiple visual elements. This limitation is qualified by 
our finding that participants tended to attribute more negative appraisals to fear stimuli compared 
to disgust stimuli. Overall, systematic differences in the visual complexity of stimuli may 
account for why participants on average did not demonstrate emotion-specific appraisals of 
disgust and fear stimuli.   
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Moreover, although the role of temporal availability was not a primary research interest 
of the present study, a second potential limitation is the rapid time intervals (e.g., 3ms, 17ms, 
30ms, 43ms) at which stimuli were presented during the appraisal task. Specifically, our selected 
interval durations may have thwarted participants’ ability to perceptually differentiate between 
disgust and fear stimuli.  When examined in light of the conceptual-act model, it becomes 
apparent that too-rapid time intervals may obstruct the conceptualization process itself. 
According to the conceptual-act model, core affect acquires meaningful affective value through 
the application of conceptual knowledge that may vary depending on situational characteristics 
and demands (Barrett, 2009; Barsalou, 2009; Lindquist, 2013). It follows that if a perceiver is 
unable to identify an external object or event, they may not be able to conceptualize their affect. 
Therefore, our rapid time intervals may have obstructed participants’ ability to make more fine-
grain distinctions between disgust and fear stimuli. Instead, participants may have been limited to 
making more broad valence-based (i.e., positive or negative) appraisals. Indeed, the results of our 
study suggest that participants on average could not differentiate between disgust and fear stimuli 
specifically but could differentiate between negative-valenced stimuli (e.g. disgust and fear) and 
neutral stimuli more generally.  
Our findings suggest that a separate threshold may exist for stimulus detection and 
stimulus discrimination. Both animal (see Tolman, 1948; Hanson et al., 1959) and human studies 
(Hawkins, 1969) support the supposition that distinguishing between visual stimuli requires a 
lengthier presentation interval than what is required for mere stimulus detection. Another 
possibility pertains to the role of conceptual knowledge in distinguishing between general 
valence and same-valenced emotions. For instance, a separate threshold may exist for 
distinguishing between valence (e.g., negative vs. neutral) and different discrete emotions (e.g., 
disgust vs. fear). Psychological constructionist models may predict that distinguishing between 
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same-valenced emotions requires the additional application of emotion conceptual knowledge 
(Barrett, 2009; Lindquist, 2013). Hence, perceivers might detect stimulus valence (e.g., negative 
vs. neutral) at one threshold and conceptualize that valence as an experience of a discrete 
emotion (e.g., fear vs. disgust) at an entirely separate threshold. Therefore, our designated time 
intervals may have been lengthy enough to facilitate the general detection of stimuli and valence 
but simply too brief to facilitate discrimination between stimuli and discrete emotion states, 
ultimately constraining emotion conceptualization.   
  In light of both the findings and the limitations of the present study, we suggest that it 
may be advantageous for future studies to utilize an image set in which the visual complexity of 
disgust and fear stimuli are systematically similar. We also suggest that future studies may 
benefit from increasing the presentation intervals of stimuli. Moreover, we also suggest that 
future studies may be more adeptly able to demystify the role of emotion conceptual knowledge 
complexity and emotion granularity in individual emotion experiences by explicitly investigating 
the influence of temporal availability in the emotion conceptualization process. Overall, the 
utilization of systematically-similar visual stimuli, lengthier stimulus presentation intervals, and 
concerted effort to scrutinize the role of temporal availability may very well be worthwhile 
directions for future studies to explore.     
Conclusion  
Emotions form the basis of all human mental life as they influence our cognition, shape 
our personality, mold our development, and guide our social interactions (Lewis, Haviland-
Jones, & Barrett, 2008; Barrett, 2009). Due to the seemingly unbidden nature by which emotions 
are often experienced, basic emotion perspectives have propagated the idea that discrete 
emotions occur invariably and universally across all contexts and perceivers. However, these 
models do not account for the sheer variability in individual emotion experiences. In contrast, 
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psychological constructionist models of emotion more adequately address the overwhelming 
variability of individual emotion experiences by proposing that emotions are composed of more 
basic psychological processes such as core affect and conceptual knowledge.   
Inspired by previous psychological constructionist literature, the present study 
endeavored to demonstrate the relationship between emotion conceptual knowledge complexity 
and emotion granularity in shaping emotion experiences. We specifically anticipated that greater 
conceptual knowledge complexity and greater emotion granularity would predict greater 
specificity in appraisals of disgust and fear stimuli on an appraisal task. We also anticipated that 
less conceptual knowledge complexity and less emotion granularity would predict less 
specificity in appraisals of disgust and fear stimuli. Contrary to our predictions, we found that 
conceptual knowledge complexity and emotion granularity did not tend to predict participants’ 
specificity of appraisals between disgust and fear stimuli. Our nonsignificant findings may be 
explained by two ostensible limitations of the study: 1) Systematic differences in stimuli 
complexity and 2) too-rapid stimulus presentation intervals. William Reddy (2001) once mused 
that “emotions, whatever they turn out to be, might provide a better ground for theorizing the 
individual than anything available so far.” As such, it is imperative for future studies to improve 
upon the limitations of the present study. Perhaps then William James’ (1884) proverbial 
question what is an emotion will finally be laid to rest.   
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Figure 1. Proportion of appraisals plotted by appraisal type and prime type. Error bars show 95% 
confidence intervals.  
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Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations for Proportion of Appraisals by Prime Type  
  
          
   Primes  
Appraisal  Fear  Disgust  Neutral  Negative  
Contamination  .44(.23)  .40(.23)  .30(.19)  .42(.22)  
Threat  .48(.22)  .42(.24)  .22(.20)  .45(.22)  
Note: Reported as means (standard deviations)  
  
